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FOREWORD
Over the past 2 years, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and the University of Pittsburgh Matthew
B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies
(Center for Latin American Studies and Office of the
Provost) have conducted two conferences: The first
was entitled “Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability in Mexico, Colombia, and the Caribbean: Implications for U.S. National Security,” and the second was
“Violent Armed Groups: A Global Challenge.”
Keynote speakers for the first conference were:
Bruce Bagley, Professor and Chair, Department of
International Studies, University of Miami and Director, University of Miami’s Center of Latin American
Studies, who addressed “What Can the Mexican State
Do to Combat Organized Crime?”; and Jorge Chabat,
Professor/Investigator, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (Center for Research and Teaching in Economics), who discussed “The Drug War in
Mexico: Dilemmas and Options.” Speakers for the second conference included Dr. Robert Mandel, Professor of International Affairs at Lewis & Clark College,
and John Robb, author of the book Brave New War. Dr.
Mandel addressed “Global Security Upheaval: Armed
Non-State Groups as Stability Enhancers,” and Mr.
Robb addressed “The Bazaar of Violence.”
The conference sponsors found the presentations
at the two conferences to be sufficiently complementary to combine them in a series of monographs under the main title of Violent Armed Groups. Specific
monographs within the series will have subtitles encompassing groups of works selected from among the
presentations by the four keynote speakers and over
40 panelists. The introduction to this first monograph,
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“Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability,” will
serve to: (1) introduce the series by providing general
conceptions of the global security challenges posed by
violent armed groups; (2) identify the issues of greatest import to scholars studying the phenomenon; and,
(3) emphasize the need for the U.S. Government to
understand variations in the challenges it faces from a
wide range of potential enemies.
In this first report, Dr. Phil Williams and Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown provide the strategic context for the
series and highlight many of the issues that will be
addressed in more detail by authors of subsequent
monographs in the series. SSI is pleased to offer this
report in fulfillment of its mission to assist U.S. Army
and Department of Defense senior leaders and strategic thinkers in understanding the key issues of the
day.
		
		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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INTRODUCTION
The rationale for this series is a reflection of the
ways in which the world of armed groups has changed
and is continuing to change, and the impact of these
changes on threats and challenges to national and
global security. Although challenges posed by various
kinds of violent armed groups initially appear highly
diverse and unrelated to one another, in fact they all
reflect the increasing connections between security
and governance—and, in particular, the relationship
between poor governance and violent armed groups.
The growth in the number of states with capacity
gaps, functional holes, and legitimacy deficits helps to
explain the resurgence of a new medievalism, and the
rise of illegal quasi-governments in localized areas.
The irony is that after several decades in which the
number of sovereign states represented in the United
Nations (UN) has increased significantly, relatively
few of these states can truly claim a monopoly on force
within their territorial borders.
Violent challengers to the Westphalian state have
taken different forms in different parts of the world.
These forms include tribal and ethnic groups, warlords, drug trafficking organizations, youth gangs, terrorists, militias, insurgents, and transnational criminal
organizations. In many cases, these groups are overtly
challenging the state; in others they are cooperating
and colluding with state structures while subtly undermining them; in yet others, the state is a passive
bystander while violent armed groups are fighting one
another. The mix is different, the combinations vary,
and the perpetrators of violence have different motives, methods, and targets. In spite of their divergent
forms, however, nonstate violent actors share certain
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qualities and characteristics. As Roy Godson and Richard Shultz have pointed out, “As surprising as it may
seem, pirate attacks off Somalia, militias in Lebanon,
and criminal armies in Mexico are part of a global pattern and not anomalies.” Indeed, these violent armed
groups or, as they are sometimes called, violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) represent a common challenge
to national and international security, a challenge that
is far greater than the sum of the individual groups,
and that is likely to grow rather than diminish over
the next several decades. Although the U.S. military—
especially the Air Force and the Navy—still place
considerable emphasis on the potential emergence of
peer competitors among foreign armed forces, more
immediate challenges have emanated not from states
but from various kinds of VNSAs.
Most obviously, on September 11, 2001 (9/11), the
United States became the target of extremist Islamic
terrorist organizations based overseas. It has subsequently had to confront the homegrown offshoots of
these groups. Most immigrants to the United States
bring with them an allegiance to their new home; a
small minority, however, retains allegiance to other
entities and causes. Moreover, there are a small but
growing number of cases in which American citizens
go abroad to fight with extremist groups or to receive
training so that they can return and carry out attacks
on American soil. Although the killing of Osama bin
Laden is seen by some observers as the beginning of
the end for al-Qaeda, the threat posed by extremist Islamic terrorist organizations is likely to be far more
enduring than any single individual or organization.
U.S. military interventions in both Iraq and Afghanistan have been compelled to confront insurgencies and terrorist groups that have proved to be
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both more agile and more resilient than anticipated
by many analysts. The counterinsurgency efforts in
Iraq had some remarkable successes in 2007 and 2008,
but with U.S. forces drawing down, questions remain
about Iraq’s long-term stability. The insurgency in Afghanistan has also proved to be a devilish challenge,
making it difficult to replicate there even the partial
success in Iraq. In both instances, corruption in government has complicated and undermined the efforts
to defeat the insurgency, while the insurgents have
used a wide variety of criminal activities to fund their
political and military campaigns. In Afghanistan, the
Taliban has benefited enormously from its linkages
with the opium and heroin industry and has been able
to make a comeback using profits generated through
taxation of farmers, protection of drug shipments, deployment of mobile laboratories, and a minor role in
trafficking.1 Moreover, the problems of governance in
Afghanistan are compounded by involvement of government officials and/or their family members in the
drug business and by corruption—factors that are as
pervasive as they are debilitating.
Drugs have funded insurgency not only in Afghanistan but also in countries as diverse as Colombia
and Burma. Moreover, the drug industry has proved
both resilient and adaptive. As the situation in Colombia has improved with the destruction of large
drug trafficking organizations with a high degree of
vertical integration, it has deteriorated in Mexico. As
Mexican drug trafficking organizations have come
to dominate wholesale markets in the United States,
so the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico have
become increasingly powerful and increasingly ruthless in their competition with one another. Indeed,
the United States is facing a massive upsurge of drug-
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related violence on its southern border. Most of this is
internecine violence among Mexican drug trafficking
organizations themselves; some is directed against the
Mexican government. The major Mexican drug trafficking organizations have a presence in almost all
major U.S. cities and are closely linked to many gangs.2
According to a Congressional Research Service Report, however, the spillover of violence from Mexico
to the United States predicted by many observers has
not yet materialized fully, even though its potential is
significant.3
The United States has already experienced an
influx of criminal organizations from countries as
diverse as Russia, Albania, Colombia, Mexico, Nigeria, China, and Vietnam. This is not surprising. The
United States (with the European Union close behind)
is the most attractive market or host state for criminals seeking lucrative criminal opportunities. These
opportunities can stem from factors as different as
the demand for illicit drugs, the growth of electronic
commerce, and the difficulties faced by law enforcement agencies when dealing with foreign groups able
to use language and dialects as defense mechanisms.
Consequently, the pattern of ethnic succession in organized crime in the United States has broadened into
a diverse and sometimes bewildering kaleidoscope,
with many of the emergent organizations maintaining
criminal linkages in their state of origin.
The global commons (in both cyber-space and
the oceans) has been subject to criminal behavior
with serious direct and indirect implications for the
United States.4 Because of the lack of a viably effective government in Somalia, Somali pirates are able to
operate with a high degree of impunity, seizing and
ransoming ships and crews moving through the Gulf
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of Aden. U.S. ships—as was evident with the seizure
of the cargo ship, Maersk Alabama—are as vulnerable
to such actions as those of any other state. Legal and
regulatory asymmetries, while not as pronounced
as state absence, can have a similar impact, enabling
cyber-criminals, for example, to operate from safe havens, targeting individuals, financial institutions, and
businesses in the United States and other countries.
Although these threats to national security are
increasingly recognized, U.S. Government institutions and agencies are still in the process of adapting
to them. Moreover, the U.S. military, including the
Army, must adapt in a period of significant budgetary
constraint. It is all the more important, therefore, that
we understand the adversaries that we have to confront. This series is designed primarily to assist this
process of knowing the enemies.
This first monograph, “Drug Trafficking, Violence,
and Instability,” focuses on the complex relationship
between human security, crime, illicit economies, and
law enforcement. It also seeks to disentangle the linkages between insurgency on the one hand and drug
trafficking and organized crime on the other, suggesting that criminal activities help sustain an insurgency,
but also carry certain risks for the insurgency.
Subsequent monographs will focus on specific areas where violent armed groups operate, or they will
delve into specifics about some of those groups. Some
works will be descriptive or historical, while others
are more analytical, but together they will clarify the
security challenges that, arguably, are the most important now faced by the United States and the rest
of the world. The series will include monographs on
Mexico, the Caribbean, and various kinds of violent
armed groups.
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CHAPTER 1
FIGHTING THE NEXUS OF ORGANIZED CRIME
AND VIOLENT CONFLICT
WHILE ENHANCING HUMAN SECURITY
Vanda Felbab-Brown
Human insecurity has greatly intensified over the
past 2 decades in many parts of Latin America. To an
unprecedented degree, ordinary people in the region
complain about living in fear of crime. With the exception of Colombia, criminal activity throughout the
region has exploded. Doubling since the 1980s, homicide rates in Latin America are among the highest in
the world. Kidnapping is also frequent. Well above 50
percent of the approximately 7,500 worldwide kidnappings in 2007 took place in Latin America.1 Overall,
the rates of violent crime are six times higher in Latin
America than in the rest of the world.2 With over 6,000
deaths reported in 2008 and over 6,500 in 2009, drugrelated violence in Mexico each year has surpassed
conflict-caused deaths in both Afghanistan and Iraq,
two countries in the midst of civil war.3 In 2011, 12,903
drug-related violence deaths were recorded, and over
50,000 since President Felipe Calderón took office.4 Organized crime is one of the principal sources of threats
to human security, but so is flourishing street crime,
which frequently receives far less attention from governments—whether the United States Government or
national governments in Latin America and the Caribbean. Indeed, law enforcement in Latin America
is clearly struggling to cope with both organized and
street crime, while 2 decades of efforts to improve
and reform law enforcement institutions have little
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to show in the way of improvements in public safety
and accountability of law enforcement. Many Latin
Americans are deeply distrustful of and dissatisfied
with their local law enforcement institutions.5
Yet, despite the clearly negative effects of high
levels of pervasive street and organized crime on human security, the relationship among human security,
crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement is highly
complex. Human security includes not only physical
safety from violence and crime, but also economic
safety from critical poverty, social marginalization,
and fundamental under-provision of such elemental
social and public goods as infrastructure, education,
health care, and rule of law. Chronically, Latin American governments have been struggling in their efforts
to provide all these public goods in large parts of their
countries, both rural and urban. These multifaceted
institutional weaknesses are at the core of why the relationship between illegality, crime, and human security is so complex. By sponsoring illicit economies in
areas of state weakness where legal economic opportunities and public goods are seriously lacking, crime
groups frequently enhance some elements of human
security even while compromising others. At the same
time, simplistic law enforcement measures can and
frequently do further degrade human security. These
pernicious dynamics become especially severe in the
context of violent conflict.
This analysis will focus particularly on the general
dynamics of the drug-violence nexus and the role of
belligerent actors and crime groups. It introduces illustrations from Latin America and assesses the intensity of threats to U.S. national security emanating
from this nexus in Latin America and elsewhere in the
world. The chapter concludes with recommendations
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for U.S. policies in dealing with the threats to U.S. national security from organized crime while at the same
time enhancing human security.
DYNAMICS OF THE DRUG-INSECURITY NEXUS
A variety of actors have penetrated various illicit
economies, including the drug trade, usually considered the most lucrative of illicit economies and estimated to generate revenues on the order of hundreds
of billions of dollars a year. An illicit economy means
any economy that supplies commodities or services
the production and marketing of which are either
completely prohibited by governments and/or international organizations, or partially proscribed unless
the production and marketing comply with special licenses, certification, taxation, and other economic and
political regulations.
Actors that participate in illicit economies include
the populations that produce the illicit commodities
and services; crime groups such as drug trafficking
organizations and mafias; belligerent actors such as
terrorist, insurgent, and paramilitary groups; and corrupt government and law enforcement officials. The
penetration of the illicit economies by terrorist or insurgent groups provides an especially potent threat
to states and regional stability since, unlike criminal
organizations that usually have more limited aims,
such belligerent groups typically seek to eliminate the
existing state’s presence in particular locales or countries.
Burgeoning and unconstrained drug production
and other illicit economies thus have profound negative consequences for states and local stability. Most
fundamentally, illicit economies provide an oppor-
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tunity for belligerent groups to increase their power
along multiple dimensions not simply by gaining control of physical resources, but also by obtaining support from local populations.6 Such belligerents hence
pose a serious security threat to local governments
and, depending on the objectives of the group, to regional and global security and U.S. interests as well.
With large financial profits, the belligerent groups
improve their fighting capabilities by increasing their
physical resources, hiring greater numbers of better
paid combatants, providing them with better weapons, and simplifying their logistical and procurement
chains.
Crucially and frequently neglected in policy considerations, such belligerents derive significant political capital—legitimacy with and support from local populations—from their sponsorship of the drug
economy. They do so by protecting the local population’s reliable (and frequently sole source of) livelihood from the efforts of the government to repress the
illicit economy. They also derive political capital by
protecting the farmers from brutal and unreliable traffickers, by bargaining with traffickers for better prices
on behalf of the farmers, by mobilizing the revenues
from the illicit economies to provide otherwise absent
social services such as clinics and infrastructure, as
well as other public goods, and by being able to claim
nationalist credit if a foreign power threatens the local
illicit economy. In short, sponsorship of illicit economies allows nonstate armed groups to function as
security providers and economic and political regulators. They are thus able to transform themselves from
mere violent actors to actors that take on proto-state
functions.
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Although the political capital such belligerents obtain is frequently thin, it is nonetheless sufficient to
motivate the local population to withhold intelligence
on the belligerent group from the government if the
government attempts to suppress the illicit economy.
Since accurate and actionable human intelligence is
vital for success in counterterrorist and counterinsurgency efforts as well as law enforcement efforts against
crime groups, such withholding seriously undermines
the efficacy of government policies.
Four factors determine the amount of political
capital which belligerent groups obtain from their
sponsorship of illicit economy: the state of the overall economy; the character of the illicit economy; the
presence (or absence) of thuggish traffickers; and the
government response to the illicit economy.
•	The state of the overall economy—poor or
rich—determines the availability of alternative
sources of income and the number of people in
a region who depend on the illicit economy for
their basic livelihood.
•	The character of the illicit economy—laborintensive or not—determines the extent to
which the illicit economy provides employment for the local population. The cultivation
of illicit crops, such as poppy in Afghanistan
and coca in Colombia, is very labor-intensive
and can provide employment to hundreds of
thousands to millions of people in a particular country. Production of methamphetamines
such as that sponsored by the United Wa State
Army in Myanmar, on the other hand, is not
labor-intensive and provides livelihoods for
many fewer people.
•	The presence (or absence) of thuggish traffickers and the government response to the illicit
5

economy (which can range from suppression to
laissez-faire to rural development) determine
the extent to which the population depends on
the belligerents to preserve and regulate the illicit economy.
In a nutshell, supporting the illicit economy will
generate the most political capital for belligerents
when the state of the overall economy is poor, the illicit economy is labor intensive, thuggish traffickers
are active in the illicit economy, and the government
has adopted a harsh strategy, such as eradication,
even in the absence of legal livelihoods and alternative opportunities.
But that does not mean that sponsorship of labor
non-intensive illicit economies brings the anti-government belligerents no political capital. If a labor nonintensive illicit economy, such as drug smuggling in
Sinaloa, Mexico, generates strong positive spillover
effects for the overall economy in that locale by boosting demand for durables, nondurables, and services
and hence indirectly providing livelihoods to and
improved economic well-being of poor populations,
it too can be a source of important political capital. In
the Mexican state of Sinaloa, for example, the drug
trade is estimated to account for 20 percent of the
state’s gross domestic product (GDP), and for some of
Mexico’s southern states, the number might be higher.7 Consequently, the political capital of the sponsors
of the drug trade there, such as the Sinaloa cartel, is
hardly negligible.
Moreover, unlike their ideologies, which rarely
motivate the wider population to support the belligerents, sponsorship of illicit economies allows belligerent groups to deliver in real time concrete material
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improvements to lives of marginalized populations.
Even when ideology wanes, when the brutality of belligerent groups alienates the wider population and
when other sources of support evaporate, this ability
to deliver material benefits to the population frequently preserves the belligerents’ political capital.
Colombia today provides a clear example. Without
doubt, the legitimacy of the leftist guerrilla group, the
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC]) is, after
decades of conflict, at an all-time low. The sources of
this decline of political capital are multiple. The political ideology of the group is largely moribund both as
a result of global changes and the decline of socialist ideologies as well as the aging and isolation of the
FARC’s intellectual leadership.8 The FARC today is
under severe pressure from the Colombian military.
The brutality of the guerrilla group toward the rural
population has progressively increased in the 1990s
and 2000s as it competed with rightist paramilitaries.
At the same time, the group systematically failed to
protect the rural and urban populations against coercion and massacres by the equally and perhaps even
more brutal paramilitary groups. Finally, as a result
of the demise of the Medellín and Cali cartels in the
mid-1990s and the growth in strength of the FARC
due to its progressive penetration of the drug trade,
the leadership decided to eliminate many traffickers
from the territories it controlled and take over their
trafficking roles in those territories.9 By doing so, the
group inadvertently eliminated a key source of its political capital. Instead of bargaining on behalf of the
cocaleros (coca farmers) for better prices for coca paste
and mitigating and regulating other forms of the traffickers’ abuse against the cocaleros as it used to do in
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the 1980s and early 1990s when independent traffickers were present,10 the FARC put itself in the position
of the brutal monopolist that sets prices, limits the
customers to whom the population can sell coca paste
and base, and inflicts abuse on the rural population.11
Yet, to the extent that the state is destroying the illegal economy on which the local population depends
for its basic livelihood, the FARC’s political capital
still remains sufficient to motivate the population not
to provide intelligence on or about the group to the
government. Indeed, in areas where coca eradication
is intense and legal economic opportunities are lacking, human intelligence flows from the broader population about the FARC are virtually nonexistent, and
the cocaleros continue to be willing to shield and even
join the FARC. Overall, the successes of the Colombian military against the FARC have been driven to
an unprecedented degree in the context of modern
counterinsurgency by signal and image intelligence as
supplemented by information from deserters. On the
other hand, in areas where coca cultivation and hence
eradication are not taking place or where rural livelihoods have been prioritized, the human intelligence
flows from the population on the FARC are considerably higher.12 Today, as consistently since the early
1980s when the FARC embraced the coca economy, its
political capital has been strongest among the cocaleros.
This ability to provide real-time, immediate economic improvements to the lives of the population
on whose support illegal groups depend also explains why even crime groups without ideology can
have strong political capital. This will be especially
the case if crime groups couple their distribution of
material benefits to poor populations with the provi-
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sion of otherwise absent order and minimal security.
By being able to out-compete the state in the provision of governance, organized crime groups can pose
significant threats to states in areas or domains where
the government’s writ is weak and its presence limited.13 Consequently, the importance of distinctions as
to whether a group is a crime group or a political one,
or whether belligerents are motivated by profit, ideology, or grievances, is frequently exaggerated in policy
discussions.14
Policies that focus on degrading the belligerents’
physical resources by attempting to destroy the illicit
economy are frequently ineffective with respect to
the objective of drying up the belligerents’ resources.
In the case of labor-intensive illicit economies where
there are no legal economic alternatives in place, such
policies are especially counterproductive with respect
to securing intelligence and weaning the population
away from the terrorists and insurgents. Eradication
of illicit crops has dubious effects on the financial profits of belligerents. Even when carried out effectively, it
might not inflict serious, if any, financial losses to the
belligerents since effective suppression of the production of the illicit commodity might actually increase
the international market price for the commodity.
Given continuing demand for the commodity, the final revenues might be even greater. This was, for example, the outcome of the Taliban ban on poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2000: after production was
suppressed by 90 percent, the value of the Taliban’s
opium and heroin stocks increased 10 times.15
Moreover, the extent of the financial losses of the
belligerents also depends on the ability of the belligerents, traffickers, and farmers to store drugs, replant after eradication, increase the number of plants per acre,
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shift production to areas that are not subject to eradication, or use high-yield, high-resistance crops. Belligerents also have the opportunity to switch to other
kinds of illicit activities such as synthetic drugs, illicit
logging, gems, illicit trade in wildlife, or fundraising
among wealthy sympathetic populations. There has
not been one case where eradication bankrupted the
belligerent organization to the point of defeating it.
Yet, although the desired impact of eradication—
to substantially curtail belligerents’ financial resources—is far from certain and is likely to take place only
under the most favorable circumstances, eradication
will definitely increase the political capital of the belligerents since the local population will all the more
strongly support the belligerents and deny the government intelligence.
Policies to interdict drug shipments or anti-money
laundering measures are less counterproductive in
terms of antagonizing the local populations from the
government, but they are extraordinarily difficult to
carry out effectively. Most belligerent groups maintain highly diversified revenue portfolios. Attempts
to turn off their income are highly intelligence-dependent and resource-intensive. With the exception of
some tactical successes in Colombia, such efforts have
yet to weaken any significant belligerent group.16
Counternarcotics policies therefore have to be
weighed very carefully, with a clear eye as to their
impact on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.
Seemingly quick fixes such as blanket eradication in the
absence of alternative livelihoods, will only strengthen the insurgency and compromise state-building and
ultimately counternarcotics efforts themselves.
It is also important to note that some illicit economies and new smuggling methods to which bel-
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ligerents are pushed as result of suppression efforts
against the original illicit economy can have far more
dangerous repercussions for global security and U.S.
national security than did the original illicit economy.
Such alternative sources of financing could involve,
for example, obtaining radioactive materials for resale
on the black market. Reports that the leftist Colombian guerrilla group, the FARC, acquired uranium for
resale so as to offset the temporary fall in its revenues
as a result of eradication during early phases of Plan
Colombia before coca cultivation there rebounded, is
an example of how unintended policy effects in this
field can be even more pernicious than the problem
they are attempting to address. The FARC’s switch
to semisubmersibles for transportation of drugs provides another worrisome example of unintended
consequences of a policy, this time intensified air and
maritime interdiction. The more widespread such
transportation technologies are among nonstate belligerent actors, the greater the likelihood that global
terrorist groups will attempt to exploit them for attacks against the United States or its assets.
Similarly, in the absence of a reduction of global
demand for narcotics, suppression of a narcotics economy in one locale will only displace production to a
different locale where threats to U.S. and global security interests may be even greater. Considerations of
such second- and third-degree effects need to be built
into policy.
Apart from strengthening belligerents and even
criminal groups in a multifaceted way, large-scale illicit economies also threaten the security and stability of the state. Politically, they provide an avenue for
criminal organizations to enter the political space, corrupting and undermining the legitimate democratic
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process. These actors, who enjoy the financial resources and political capital generated by sponsoring the
illicit economy, frequently experience great success
in politics. They are able to secure official positions
of power as well as wield influence from behind the
scenes. The problem perpetuates itself as successful
politicians bankrolled with illicit money make it more
difficult for would-be innocent actors to resist participating in the illicit economy, leading to endemic corruption at both the local and national levels. Guatemala, El Salvador, and Haiti are cases in point.17
Large illicit economies dominated by powerful
traffickers also have pernicious effects on a country’s
law enforcement and judicial systems. As the illicit
economy grows, the investigative capacity of the law
enforcement and judicial systems diminishes. Impunity for criminal activity increases, undermining the
credibility of law enforcement, the judicial system, and
the authority of the government.18 Powerful traffickers
frequently turn to violent means to deter and avoid
prosecution, killing or bribing prosecutors, judges,
and witnesses. Colombia in the late 1980s and Mexico
today are powerful reminders of the corruption and
paralysis of law enforcement as a result of extensive
criminal networks and the devastating effects of high
levels of violent criminality on the judicial system.
In addition, illicit economies have large and complex economic effects.19 Drug cultivation and processing, for example, generate employment for the poor
rural populations and might even facilitate upward
mobility. As mentioned above, they can also have
powerful macroeconomic spillover effects in terms of
boosting overall economic activity. But a burgeoning
drug economy also contributes to inflation and can
hence harm legitimate, export-oriented, import-sub-
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stituting industries. It encourages real estate speculation and undermines currency stability. It also displaces legitimate production. Since the drug economy
is more profitable than legal production, requires less
security and infrastructure, and imposes smaller sunk
and transaction costs, the local population is frequently uninterested in, or unable to participate in, other
(legal) kinds of economic activity. The illicit economy
can thus lead to a form of so-called Dutch disease,
where a boom in an isolated sector of the economy
causes, or is accompanied by, stagnation in other core
sectors, since it gives rise to appreciation of land and
labor costs.
EFFECTS OF REGIONAL MANIFESTATIONS OF
THE DRUG-CONFLICT NEXUS ON U.S.
SECURITY
Even though the drug-conflict nexus follows these
general dynamics irrespective of the locale, how acute
a threat to U.S. security interests it presents depends
on the strategic significance of the state weakened by
such connections and the orientation of the belligerent
group toward the United States.
Perhaps nowhere in the world does the presence
of a large-scaled illicit economy threaten U.S. primary
security interests as much as in Afghanistan. There,
the anti-American Taliban strengthens its insurgency
campaign by deriving both vast financial profits and
great political capital from sponsoring the illicit economy. The strengthened insurgency in turn threatens
the vital U.S. objectives of counterterrorism and Afghanistan’s stability plus the lives of U.S. soldiers and
civilians deployed there to promote these objectives.
The large-scale opium poppy economy also under-
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mines these goals by fueling widespread corruption
of Afghanistan government and law enforcement, especially the police forces.20
A failure to prevail against the insurgency will
result in the likely collapse of the national government and Taliban domination of Afghanistan’s south,
possibly coupled with civil war. A failure to stabilize
Afghanistan will in turn further destabilize Pakistan,
emboldening the jihadists in Pakistan and weakening
the resolve of Pakistan’s military and intelligence services to take on the jihadists. Pakistan may likely once
again calculate that it needs to cultivate its jihadi assets to counter India’s influence in Afghanistan—perceived or actual.
But the seriousness of the threat and the strategic
importance of the stakes do not imply that aggressive
counternarcotics suppression measures taken today
will enhance U.S. objectives and global stability. Indeed, just the opposite. Premature measures, such as
extensive eradication before legal livelihoods are in
place, will simply cement the bonds between the rural
population dependent on poppy cultivation for basic
livelihood and the Taliban, limit intelligence flows
to Afghan and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) forces, and further discredit the Afghan government and tribal elites sponsoring eradication. Nor,
given the Taliban’s large sources of other income, will
eradication bankrupt the Taliban. In fact, eradication
so far has failed to accomplish that while already generating counterproductive outcomes.
After years of an inappropriate focus on eradication of the poppy crop, the new Barack Obama counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan announced in
the summer of 2009, promised to mesh well with the
counterinsurgency and state-building effort. By scal-
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ing back eradication and emphasizing interdiction
and development, it will help separate the population
from the Taliban. A well-designed counternarcotics
policy is not on its own sufficient for success in Afghanistan, but it is an indispensable condition. Counterinsurgent forces can prevail against belligerents
profiting from the drug trade when they increase their
own counterinsurgency resources and improve the
strategy.
Moreover, “success” in suppressing poppy in Afghanistan might well increase threats to U.S. security
in other ways. Given existing global demand, poppy
cultivation will shift elsewhere. There are many countries where poppy can be grown; but Burma, which
used to be the number one producer for many years,
the countries of Central Asia, and Pakistan are likely
candidates. A shift to Pakistan would be by far the
most worrisome. In that case, Pakistani jihadi groups
would not only be able to increase their profits, but
also, most dangerously, their political capital. Today,
they have little to offer but ideological succor to the
unsatisfied populations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the Northwest Frontier Province,
and wider Pakistan. If widespread poppy cultivation
shifted to these areas, Kashmir, and possibly even
parts of Punjab, the jihadist belligerents would be
much strengthened by providing real-time economic
benefits to marginalized populations.
Drug trafficking organizations in Mexico pose
perhaps the second greatest threat to U.S. security on
the part of today’s actors involved in the global drug
trade. Unlike jihadi terrorist groups in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, they do not seek to target the U.S. homeland or intend to conduct a deadly terrorism campaign
against the United States. Nor do they have the capac-
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ity or desire to overthrow the Mexican government.
Mexico is not a failing state. But any spillover of the
drug war from Mexico could threaten public safety in
certain U.S. localities, including substantial increases
in murder rates, kidnapping, and other violent crime.
In Mexico, the drug violence has already not only
undermined Mexican citizens’ human security and
overall public safety, but also resulted in suppressed
economic activity, including tourism. The provision of
public safety is an inescapable and irreducible responsibility of the state, and Mexico is clearly struggling
in its delivery. While the political capital of Mexican
drug trafficking organizations is limited by their brutality and the fact that the dominant aspect of the drug
trade there is labor non-intensive trafficking, they do
have political capital that the Mexican government
has so far not attempted to counter, focusing instead
on narrow interdiction. In Mexico, this political capital
comes from the aforementioned spillovers from the illicit economy, the cartels’ sponsorship of labor-intensive poppy and cannabis cultivation, and the fact that
the cartels now dominate not simply illegal economies
but also informal economies in Mexico, such as street
sales of CDs in the Zócalo (public square) area.21 Consequently, Mexico’s law enforcement strategy needs
to be complemented by socio-economic efforts to
break the bonds between Mexico’s extensive poor and
marginalized population and the criminal groups.
Indeed, a focus on the narcos and on changing the
relationship between the Mexican state and society is
now the fourth pillar of the new orientation of the Merida Initiative. The other three pillars of the reoriented
strategy include: (1) moving away from high-value
targeting of drug trafficking organization capos to a
more comprehensive interdiction effort that targets
the entire drug organization and giving newly trained
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police forces the primary street security function
once again while gradually relegating the military
to a background support function; (2) building a secure but smart U.S.-Mexico border that also facilitates
trade; and (3) building up Mexico’s civilian capacity.22
The fourth pillar—focused on weaning the population away from the narcos—seeks to build resilient
communities in Mexico to prevent their takeover by
Mexican crime organizations. Through a variety of urban development initiatives, the Mexican government
hopes to persuade Mexican citizens who are deeply
dissatisfied with the violence that it can better provide
them with public goods and social services than can
the narcos. The effort also aims to restore hope for underprivileged Mexicans—20 percent of Mexicans live
below the extreme poverty line, and at least 40 percent
of the Mexican economy is informal—that a better future and possibility of social progress lie ahead if they
remain in the legal economy. Such bonds between the
community and the state are what at the end of the
day will allow the state to prevail and crime to attenuate.23 But these bonds are very hard to build—all the
more so given the structural deficiencies of Mexico’s
economy. To mend these, President Felipe Calderón
has unveiled a host of social programs oriented toward bringing jobs, education, and public spaces to
Cuidad Juarez. How swiftly and effectively these programs will be implemented remains to be seen.
In Colombia and Africa, the threats to U.S. national security and global stability are comparatively less robust. Colombia is a close U.S. ally, and the
United States has accordingly committed over $6 billion to help Colombia achieve security, promote human rights and justice, and reduce the cultivation of
illicit crops. While coca in Colombia today remains
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at levels comparable to or greater than those before
intensified aerial spraying began under Plan Colombia, the FARC today is clearly much weakened as a
result of the U.S. resources, training, and intelligence
provided to the Colombian military.24 Even though
the case of the so-called false positives (civilians shot
by the Colombian military and dressed up as guerrillas to show a greater body count) raises serious questions about the military campaign and its successes,
security is undeniably better.25 The demobilization of
Colombia’s paramilitaries greatly enhanced security
and reduced kidnapping in Colombia, even though
new paramilitary groups—sometimes referred to as
bandas criminales (criminal bands) or grupos emergentes (emerging paramilitary groups)—are springing up
and once again threaten local security. As mentioned
before, the FARC’s popularity today is lower than
ever, but forced eradication without legal alternatives
in place unfortunately assures that many cocaleros still
reject the Colombian state, are willing to put up with
the FARC, and are even willing to join the FARC.
Clearly, the United States has an interest in Colombia’s enhanced security, prosperity, and human rights
promotion. But that country’s violent armed groups
have not greatly threatened U.S. security interests
beyond the FARC’s shooting at spraying planes and
oil pipelines belonging to U.S. companies. The three
U.S. contractors held by the FARC went through a
terrible ordeal, and their rescue in 2008 was a joyful
moment. But overall, neither the FARC nor the other
leftist guerrilla group, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army [ELN]), have sought to
conduct a terrorist campaign against U.S. citizens and
major U.S. assets or attack the U.S. homeland. Allegations of al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah contacts
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with the FARC or these groups’ penetration of the
Latin American drug trade have not proven to be a
serious menace.26
Similarly, the resurgent Sendero Luminoso (Shining
Path) in Peru is once again profiting from the drug
trade there and once again mobilizing cocaleros alienated from the state as a result of eradication. But the
group is still comparatively weak and internally oriented.27
In Africa, the drug trade clearly threatens the weak
states. But once again, while highly worrisome, this
threat has not yet affected U.S. security interests or
global stability. There is always the possibility that
global terrorist groups will seek to exploit African
drug trade opportunities for financing and other
gains. But terrorist groups can equally seek to exploit
legal sources of revenue. Interestingly enough, Somalia’s jihadi al Shabab, while to some extent tapping
into pirates’ profits, has not sought to exploit the qat
trade between Kenya, Somalia, and the greater Horn
of Africa. Instead, al Shabab has prohibited both qat
consumption and trade, thus alienating many Somalis
and antagonizing key business interests and powerbrokers. So far, however, this has not hampered the
group’s ability to spread through the country and to
threaten the very survival of the government.
OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS
In conclusion, I can offer several broad policy recommendations:
•	Counterinsurgency should not rely on suppression of illicit economies to defeat or even substantially weaken belligerents. Military forces,
whether domestic or international, should fo-
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cus directly on defeating the belligerents and
protecting the population. Efforts to limit the
belligerents’ resources should focus on mechanisms that do not harm the wider population
directly, even though such discriminate efforts
are difficult to undertake effectively because of
their resource intensiveness.
•	When dealing with labor-intensive illicit economies in poor countries, governments should
undertake suppression efforts that affect the
wider population only after military conflict
has been brought to an end. Even after the
conflict has ended, eradication of illicit crops
should be undertaken only when the population has access to effective alternative livelihood programs.
•	Efforts to provide legal alternative livelihoods
to marginalized poor populations, as painstaking and long-term as they are, should lie at the
core of U.S. counternarcotics efforts abroad.
Encouraging and extending economic development of the region have to take place not only
through steadfast promotion of free trade, but
also through determined effort to assist national governments with the development of socioeconomic periphery areas. As the previous 2
decades have shown, free trade on its own does
not guarantee that unskilled, poor, marginalized populations in the rural peripheries and
urban slums can participate in the global market and reap benefits from it. The United States
and Latin American governments should pay
greater attention to rural development in the
hemisphere as well as to the integration of urban peripheries into the productive and legal
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realm of society. If larger segments of the populations are capable of plugging into the global
legal economy and see their socioeconomic
condition improve, they will depend less on illicit economies and be more willing to cooperate with efforts to reduce them.
•	In short, U.S. efforts to suppress violent crime
need to be designed to enhance human security
in its many facets.
•	Interdiction efforts should be designed to limit
the coercive and corruptive power of criminal
groups rather than to simply and predominantly focus on suppressing the supply of an illicit
commodity.
•	Governments and international organizations
need to consider where the illicit economy is
likely to reemerge if suppression efforts in a
particular country or region are effective and
what the resulting national security and global
stability implications will be. Governments and
international organizations also need to consider the possibility—including security implications—that if suppression succeeds, other illicit
economies will replace the current one.
Governments and their international partners
must address the demand for illicit drugs. Such focus
on demand reduction in the United States and abroad
will not only greatly enhance the U.S. goal of reducing
drug consumption, but also best mitigate the dangerous security consequences of the drug-terrorism and
drug-insurgency nexus.
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CHAPTER 2
INSURGENCIES AND ORGANIZED CRIME1
Phil Williams
INTRODUCTION
Violence is expensive but can also be highly profitable. Emperors, dictators, and even modern democratic
leaders are able to pay for violence by drawing on the
resources of those under their territorial and political
control. In European history, in particular, warmaking
and state-building long went hand in hand.2 Indeed,
the 20th century total wars were as much about the
capacity of states to mobilize resources as they were
about military strategy—and those with access to the
most resources ultimately prevailed.
In contrast, many of the nonstate groups which
now challenge states internally or challenge the international status quo, often have very limited access to
resources. They are much weaker than states, a difference that has been encapsulated in the notion of
asymmetric warfare. Insurgencies, by definition, are
engaged in asymmetrical conflict with states. Even
though many of these states suffer from capacity gaps,
functional holes, and legitimacy deficits—all factors
that typically contributed to dissatisfaction and insurgency—they usually have a much larger resource base
than insurgents, at least at the outset. In some cases,
insurgencies have compensated for their weakness by
obtaining access to external resources typically provided by external powers hostile either to the existing government or to the political system within the
state and seeking to bring about change without direct

27

confrontation with other great powers. During the
Cold War in particular, such arrangements suited the
two superpowers and weak regimes, resulting in the
prevalence of what might be termed “insurgency by
proxy.” The results were that insurgencies were rarely
short of resources, while the issue of insurgency funding became part of the Soviet-American propaganda
battle rather than something to be examined rigorously in its own right.
With the recent insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the continuing insurgency in Colombia,
more attention is being given to the funding of insurgencies, to their use of criminal activities, and to their
relationships with criminal organizations (especially,
but not exclusively, drug trafficking organizations).
One of the early pioneers in this area was Steven Metz
who, in an important and prescient analysis in 1993,
differentiated between spiritual and commercial insurgencies, noting how the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia was becoming torn between the competing impulses of ideological purity on the one side and the desire to exploit
the drug business to expand its revenue base on the
other.3 More recently, Gretchen Peters dissected the
linkages between drugs, insurgency, and terror in Afghanistan; Svante Cornell explored the link between
drugs and conflict more broadly;4 and Vanda FelbabBrown provided a set of detailed and valuable case
studies on the links between armed conflict and the
drug trade as well as the relationships between counterinsurgency and counternarcotics efforts.5 Other
analysts such as Peter Chalk have explored the criminal activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE), while William Noel Ivey titled a chapter on
the Naxalite insurgency in India, “Robin Hood or Al
Capone?”6 Another useful set of writings has focused
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on need, creed, and greed arguments, while the issue
of resource extraction or lootable resources has been
illuminated by Richard Snyder, who links it explicitly to the outbreak of conflict on the one side and the
maintenance of stability on the other.7 Indeed, Snyder
develops a compelling and highly relevant “political
economy of extraction framework that explains political order and state collapse as alternative outcomes in
the face of lootable wealth.”8
Progress has also been made in understanding
the linkage between terrorism and organized crime,
especially since September 11, 2001 (9/11). The focus
on terrorist funding has even provided some insights
into insurgency funding (although often at the expense of the distinction between terrorist organizations and insurgencies). Tamara Makarenko identified
a continuum between terrorism and organized crime,
highlighting points of convergence between the two,
in ways that were, in some respects, illuminating although not wholly persuasive.
Others who have contributed to the analysis of
the connections between terrorism and organized
crime include Christopher Dishman, John Picarelli,
and Christopher Oehme, while Lyubov Mincheva
and Ted Robert Gurr have astutely analyzed points
of convergence and divergence between criminal and
political organizations and delineated the ways in
which the organizations are likely to cooperate.9 One
of the most useful explorations of insurgency and organized crime, however, remains that by R. Thomas
Naylor whose dissection of what he terms “the insurgent economy” is full of important insights. Naylor’s
analysis is somewhat dated but is both incisive and,
for the most part, highly compelling.10 It is complemented by Felbab-Brown’s cogent examination of the
intersections of insurgencies and the drug business.11
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It is perhaps all the more surprising, therefore,
that even today in many discussions of insurgencies,
the themes of funding through criminal activities and
links between insurgencies and criminal enterprises
are dealt with in a perfunctory manner at best. David
Kilcullen in The Accidental Guerilla, for example, gives
neither issue more than a cursory glance, and there
is a danger that one of the major lessons being taken
from Iraq is that strategy is critical and resources are
secondary.12 While other analysts of insurgencies are
more sensitive to the resource and funding issues,
even now there is no general treatment of the relationship between insurgency and organized crime—apart
from the works by Naylor and Felbab-Brown—which
offers the same kind of illuminating insights as the
RAND studies of how insurgencies end or Weinstein’s
analysis of the organization of insurgent violence.13
All this is understandable. There are several conceptual and methodological problems that immediately confront efforts to deal with insurgencies and
organized crime. The first is the issue of labeling and
distinguishing between insurgency and terrorism.
Makarenko solves this by conflating the two.14 Naylor,
in contrast, has argued that terror is only a tactic and
that therefore the primary focus should be on insurgencies and guerrilla groups. Since the events of 9/11,
however, conflation has become the dominant motif
both in academic writings and at the policy level. The
distinction between insurgency and terrorism was
also blurred by the Bush administration’s very broad
use of the term terrorist. This tendency was mirrored
by some recipients of U.S. aid who confronted insurgencies but saw the utility of labeling them “terrorist threats,” echoing the way the communist threat
was exploited during the Cold War. Having said this,

30

there can certainly be an overlap between insurgency
and terrorism. U.S. forces in Iraq, for example, had
to confront what was, in essence, a composite insurgency—or what Thomas Hammes termed a coalition
insurgency—in which foreign jihadis affiliated with
or inspired by al-Qaeda fought alongside Ba’athist
groups and Sunni tribes.15 At times Shia militia, especially Jaish-al-Mahdi (JAM), also became part of the
insurgency. Nevertheless, it remains possible to differentiate between insurgents who see the state as
the prize, want to replace the existing government,
and are concerned with legitimacy and governance
on one hand, and terrorists who tend to pursue less
specific and more amorphous objectives on the other.
Even with such a differentiation between terrorist
and insurgent, considerable fuzziness at the edges is
inescapable, especially with nationalist organizations
such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
or the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
These problems are compounded when organized
crime is brought into the equation. As suggested
above, Makarenko deals with the issue through the
articulation of a crime-terror continuum along which
criminals and terrorists both use each other’s methods and cooperate with one another. This remains one
of the most serious efforts to provide a framework of
analysis and has been widely adopted. The difficulty with Makarenko’s analysis is that the continuum
covers both activities and connections—even though
these are very different—which are lumped together
under the rubric of the crime-terrorism nexus. In contrast, the present author has made a distinction between entities and activities and suggested that “doit-yourself” organized crime by terrorists is far more
important than the linkages between the two kinds of
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groups.16 Furthermore, it is when engaging in criminal
activities for profit that terrorist groups and networks
are most likely to develop cooperative linkages with
criminal enterprises. Yet even this is not preordained.
The PKK, for example, became deeply involved in
drug trafficking in Europe, but rather than cooperating with the traditional Kurdish criminal networks already there, it sought to drive them out of the market
and replace them. The relationship between the PKK
and Kurdish criminal organizations was characterized not by cooperation but by a series of turf wars
over heroin markets in Europe, struggles that the PKK
mostly won.17
Some observers have responded to questions
about the relationship between organized crime and
terrorism by resurrecting the term narco-terrorism.
The original incarnation of this term referred to drug
trafficking organizations—especially those in Medellin—using terror as an integral part of the trafficking
enterprise. Yet today narco-terrorism is used primarily to describe insurgent or terrorist organizations using drug trafficking to fund their political campaigns
of violence. A term that can be used to describe two
very different phenomena is so elastic that it ceases to
be helpful—although it is worth noting that in Peru
the term narco-terrorism has become enshrined in
Article 296-B of the Penal Code.18 What makes this
somewhat ironic is that the term was not entirely appropriate even in the 1990s when Sendero Luminoso
(Shining Path) appeared to be working together with
drug trafficking organizations in the Upper Huallaga
Valley. Although this is often presented as the classic
example of alliance between drug traffickers and insurgents, Pablo Dreyfus cautioned very persuasively
that it was:
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difficult to define the relationship between drug traffickers and Sendero Luminoso as an alliance or even
a “marriage of convenience.” The traffickers accepted
Sendero’s protection because they did not have a
choice. The insurgents defeated them militarily. Moreover, the pattern of interaction between traffickers and
Sendero was less than beneficial for the traffickers because the insurgents obliged them to pay higher coca
prices to the peasants.19

This dynamic seems to have changed, however,
and the comeback of what appears to be a less vicious
Sendero Luminoso is linked to its position as an intermediary between Peruvian peasants and Mexican
drug trafficking organizations. Sendero Luminoso has
reemerged in the VRAE, the valley surrounding the
Apurimac and Ene Rivers, which is also the second
largest coca-producing area in Peru. According to
“Comrade Dalton,” a high-ranking (now imprisoned)
member of Sendero Luminoso and brother-in-law of
“Comrade Jose,” the reputed head of Sendero, the
group maintains a “strategic alliance” with drug traffickers, regarding this as essential for the armed struggle against the government.20 Some critics, however,
contend that the new “kinder, gentler” Sendero Luminoso is more concerned about profit than politics.
Some commentators, rather than reworking old
terms and giving them a new twist, have coined new
terms. For example, John Sullivan, a very astute commentator on crime, terrorism, and insurgency, has used
the term criminal insurgency to describe the drug-related violence in Mexico.21 Although this has some appeal, it is misleading. Most drug trafficking violence
stems from a competition among the major trafficking
organizations for control of strategic warehouses in
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the major cities along Mexico’s northern border and
access to the highways into the United States. The development of local consumer markets in Mexico has
added another dimension to the competition; so too
has the emergence of a younger generation of traffickers. The killings of policemen and soldiers, although
certainly not insignificant, represent approximately
10 percent of the total violence. Moreover, most of
this violence is targeted in precise rather than indiscriminate ways, with very specific military and law
enforcement targets. The major exception—the throwing of grenades into a crowd in Morelia in September
2008—was widely condemned by many trafficking
organizations. Nor is there any evidence that the drug
trafficking organizations are seeking political power.
In effect, what they want is to maintain the space and
freedom to carry out their trafficking operations. The
aim is to neutralize, intimidate, or render complaisant
the Mexican state, not to overthrow it.
None of this, however, makes the violence less
horrendous. Indeed, what appears to be a growing carelessness in drug-related violence in Mexico
is particularly disturbing. There are indications that
violence is becoming an end in itself, or even a form
of empowerment for the perpetrators, reminiscent of
elemental terrorism without political aims. In effect,
the traditional norms of selectivity and restraint in
the criminal use of violence are eroding and aberrant
forms of behavior are becoming fashionable. In some
respects, the increase in what can best be described
as anomic violence is more disturbing than a criminal insurgency pursuing political objectives and using
purposeful violence to achieve these objectives.
Nevertheless, the search for a new term to encapsulate what is going on in Mexico reflects an important impulse: sometimes changes in the security
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environment require new assessments and new conceptualizations of security challenges. The difficulty
with both old and new labels, however, is that they
all too easily become a substitute for unpackaging the
relationships between insurgencies and organized
crime. Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe, in particular, emphasize that the essence of mindfulness is to
be willing to recognize when old conceptualizations
and categorizations are inadequate to capture new
realities.22 The implication is that these relationships
need to be examined very thoroughly both to enhance
understanding and to identify more effective policy
choices. In fact, explorations of the relationships between insurgencies and organized crime go to the
heart not only of obvious issues such as insurgency
effectiveness and sustainability, but also to questions
of identity, legitimacy, organizational structure and
cohesion, and organizational transformation.
In this connection, a vexing but important conceptual issue concerns the extent to which insurgencies
can be regarded as monolithic—either vertically or
horizontally. The natural tendency is to treat an insurgency as a cohesive social movement, when in fact
there are often important differences within it from
top to bottom, that is, vertically. Followers sometimes
diverge from the principles and injunctions of their
leaders as command and control prove far more tenuous than in traditional military organizations. Or different components of an insurgency will sometimes
differ in their objectives and priorities, that is, horizontally. Where you stand can depend as much on where
you fight as on where you sit. As suggested above,
the insurgency in Iraq was a composite made up of
different elements, some of which were nationalistic
and concerned only with eviction of U.S. forces, while
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others wanted to reestablish Sunni and/or Ba’athist
dominance in the country. Even where there is less
diversity, divisions might still exist. For example, it is
not clear that insurgents who engage in criminal activities are always acting on behalf of the insurgency
as a whole. In some instances, criminal fund-raising
might be a side activity for personal enrichment. In
other cases, all the funds will go to the movement.
A third possibility is that the money will be divided,
with some kept by the fund-raisers and some donated
to the cause. Clearly, resource distribution can have
important implications for group cohesion, sometimes
strengthening and sometimes weakening it.
Another analytical difficulty concerns the extent to
which the appropriate focus should be on the objectives of groups as opposed to the means they use. This
is sometimes described as the motives versus methods
issue.23 Even if money is simply a means to an end for
insurgencies and an end in itself for criminal organizations, the process of fundraising is much the same.
In this sense, the activities of criminal enterprises on
the one side and insurgents on the other will often appear very similar. Although these difficulties are unavoidable, they can be overcome by efforts at analytic
clarity. Consequently, it is critical to outline the key
assumptions underlying the analysis.
The first assumption is that insurgencies are expensive, and that resources therefore matter a great
deal. This is true even in the straightforward use of
terror, where the costs of planning and implementing an attack often turn out to be much higher than
police or observer estimates in the immediate aftermath lead us to believe. Perhaps the best example is
the Madrid bombings, where the real cost was somewhere between 43,000 and 54,000 Euros and not the
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U.S.$10,000 initially estimated by the United Nations
(UN) and repeated endlessly thereafter, even by
prominent scholars. The costs of insurgencies are considerable, not least because the insurgents have to act
as what Naylor termed “nascent governments” if they
are to acquire the level of legitimacy and public support that would make them a serious contender for
power.24 Indeed, most insurgents and some terrorist
organizations engage in social provision as a means of
legitimizing their violence and mobilizing support.25
Even if such efforts are relatively modest, the level of
resources available to insurgents will have a significant impact on their ability to sustain their campaigns.
In this connection, both methods—the use of criminal
methods by insurgents and cooperation between insurgents and criminal organizations, especially drug
trafficking groups—can be crucial means of resource
generation or weapons acquisition.
The second assumption is that organized crime can
be understood in two distinct ways—as entities and
activities. The entities are criminal enterprises concerned about profit. These groups or organizations
are Clausewitzian in the sense that their criminal activities are simply a continuation of business by other
means. Organized crime can also be understood as
a set of activities. These activities or methods can be
appropriated by other nonstate actors and by states.
This means that insurgencies can use organized crime
activities as a funding mechanism and/or can develop
relationships of mutual advantage with criminal enterprises.
As to the third assumption, both insurgencies and
criminal organizations are dynamic social actors constantly adapting to new constraints and opportunities
and seeking to outwit their adversaries in law enforcement, the military, and intelligence agencies. In effect,
37

they are engaged in a process of competitive adaptation with their adversaries.26 In addition, such groups
often have life cycles, and, to some extent, their activities and their relationships will be determined in part
by where in these cycles they are located. In the early
stages of an insurgency, for example, “a guerilla group
may cooperate with domestic and local criminal organizations on the basis of their shared status as social
outcasts and their shared immediate objective.”27 As
both groups mature, however, cooperation might be
more elusive. One of the reasons for this, as Naylor has
argued, is that “mature criminality is compatible with
the continued existence of the formal state” whereas
“mature insurgency threatens its overthrow.”28 Yet
even in these circumstances, it might still be possible
for the two groups to engage in some degree of cooperation where there are obvious opportunities for
mutual gain.29 Divergence between what Mincheva
and Gurr usefully describe as interest-driven criminal
organizations and identity-driven political groups is
also a plausible outcome.30 Under some conditions the
challenges for an insurgency of maintaining identity
and establishing legitimacy might well supersede the
desire for connectivity and cooperation.
Against this background the analysis here seeks to
do several things:
•	To identify the ways in which insurgencies appropriate the methods of criminal enterprises
to fund themselves. Indeed, the next part of
this chapter examines the extent to which, and
the ways in which, different insurgencies have
used criminal activities as a funding mechanism. Although much of this is well known,
patterns of commonality and important variations from one insurgency to another need to
be identified.
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•	To explore the spectrum of relationships between insurgents and criminal enterprises.
Relationships can be based on some elements
of common identity, short-term expediency, or
long-term mutual advantage. They can range
from what are little more than market transactions or service requirements to enduring strategic alliances.
•	To identify and explore the consequences of the
appropriation of criminal methods by insurgencies. The chapter suggests that insurgent use of
criminal activities for fund-raising is likely to
have paradoxical consequences, strengthening
insurgency in the short term but compromising
or weakening it in the long term. Criminal fundraising can help insurgencies meet their obligations but is not without risk. The nature of this
risk is spelled out in terms of the slippery slope
of criminality.
INSURGENCIES APPROPRIATING ORGANIZED
CRIME AS A FUNDING MECHANISM
Although it is easy to find historical examples in
which insurgents used criminal activities as a funding mechanism, there is no clear baseline. In the Algerian insurgency, for example, a ban on criminal activities such as prostitution and drug trafficking was
established, even though several of the leaders of the
National Liberation Front (FLN), most especially Ben
Bella, had a criminal background.31 In some ways,
however, fighting against colonial powers, often with
the support of significant parts of the population, was
relatively manageable as the insurgents could obtain
shelter and support from the population. They could
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also expect some financial help from sympathetic external powers. In the case of the FLN, assistance came
from Algeria’s neighbors. With the end of the Cold
War and the loss of superpower funding for proxyinsurgencies, those challenging the state have had to
become more self-reliant. Perhaps nothing has contributed more to what Hammes has described as the
self-sufficiency of contemporary insurgencies than the
growing exploitation of criminal activities.32
One of the first techniques in the criminal repertoire adopted by insurgencies is kidnapping.33 Groups
in Mindanao and elsewhere in the Philippines, the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Taliban, and
the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation
Army [ELN]), and FARC in Colombia, have all used
kidnapping for ransom as a means of funding. Not only
does kidnapping require little investment, it can have
high payoffs, especially if it involves the abduction of
foreigners.34 Indeed, in many respects kidnapping is
an ideal crime for insurgencies. Kidnapping can generate a climate of fear and intimidation, highlight the
inability of the government to maintain security, and
provide a major revenue stream. For contemporary
insurgencies, kidnapping can even be a powerful strategic weapon. In Iraq, for example, the kidnapping of
a Filipino truck driver in July 2004 led the Arroyo government to withdraw its 51-person military contingent
a month ahead of time, contributing to a major hiccup
in the relationship between Washington and Manila.
Yet this was only part of the story. The kidnappers
reportedly received a ransom that could have been as
high as U.S.$6 million.35 According to one Iraqi newspaper, the government of the Philippines believed the
kidnapping was a purely a political one, only to discover at the end that it was also—and perhaps even
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primarily—about money.36 In Iraq, the kidnapping of
foreigners proved extremely lucrative as the French,
German, and Italian governments paid somewhere in
the region of $45 million for the release of hostages.37
How much of this went to insurgents and how much
to jihadi groups is difficult to determine. Somewhat
ironically, given the relative lack of attention, the kidnapping of Iraq’s own citizens was even more lucrative, particularly at its peak in 2006 when as many as
40 Iraqis a day were abducted, and the profits reached
at least $140 million.38 Once again, there is little, if any,
open source information on the distribution of the
profits among insurgent and jihadi groups on the one
side and kidnapping gangs concerned only about the
money on the other. The emergence of kidnapping as
a funding mechanism for insurgents is not unique to
Iraq. It was also used extensively by Chechen rebels
during the 1990s, and has long been a staple activity
of FARC in Colombia. More recently, kidnapping for
ransom in both Afghanistan and Pakistan has provided an important revenue stream for the Taliban and
associated groups.
Although Naylor argues that bank robberies are
the other staple activity of insurgencies, particularly
in their early stages, other opportunities open up as
the insurgents establish a degree of territorial control. The Karen National Liberation Army in Burma,
for example, was able to tax clandestine teak exports
from the area where the insurgents were established.39
The FARC in Colombia has become involved in illegal
gold mining, with some evidence suggesting that the
organization “controlled up to 15 gold mines just in
Bolívar department, in northern Colombia. Officials
say that in some areas the FARC mines gold directly,
whereas in others it extorts ‘tax’ payments from small-
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scale, and mainly illegal, miners.”40 In other instances
where insurgents obtained a degree of control in border regions, they were able to levy taxes on the smuggling of a variety of commodities: the Kosovo Liberation Army, for example, did this very successfully,
collecting cash and sometimes weapons from smuggling organizations.41 When they engage in extortion
of this kind, insurgencies have the characteristics of
mafias in the strict sense of the term, as defined by
Diego Gambetta, in that they engage in the business
of private protection.42 Similarly:
in parts of Afghanistan where there is little or no
poppy grown, insurgents seem to rely more heavily on kidnapping, shakedowns, and protecting other
smuggled goods, ranging from timber and gemstones
to people and legal goods like tires and cooking oil.43

Sometimes protection can evolve into more direct
involvement in exploitation of natural resources and
even into participation in smuggling networks. In Colombia, for example, the FARC went into the business
of protecting and taxing drug growers in much the
same way that it taxed cattle ranchers. Soon, though,
FARC’s relationship with the drug trade was to become much more intimate. This was a very natural
development. As Naylor points out, “the drug trade,
in the best of liberal capitalist tradition, attracted
guerilla groups regardless of their race, color, creed,
or political affiliation.”44 Indeed, FARC’s role gradually expanded from protecting and extorting the drug
business to becoming directly involved in trafficking.
Yet this became a source of some internal contention,
with at least three divergent positions emerging: those
who were extensively involved in both trafficking and
taxing of the drug industry and were led by the 16th
42

Front, which became the organization’s main moneymaker; those who were reluctant to traffic in drugs but
were willing to extort the drug growers and traffickers through the imposition of “taxes”; and those who
wanted nothing to do with the business. The antipathy
of this third group to involvement in the drug business seems to have stemmed from concerns that crass
commercialism might replace ideological purity in the
organization.45 In the event, though, this group was to
lose the battle for the soul of FARC. In April 2000, the
Paris-based Observatoire Geopolitique Des Drogues (Geopolitical Drug Watch [OGD]) reported that the FARC
was taking over the role of the trafficker middlemen,
buying coca paste and cocaine base from growers to
supply processing labs.46 This was the “point of no return on the road to criminalizing” the organization.47
FARC subsequently established itself as a supplier to
the Costa criminal organization in Brazil and the Arellano Felix Organization based in Tijuana.
Other fronts also became involved in the drug
business, and some members of FARC succumbed
to the inevitable temptation of moving downstream
in the drug trafficking chain, importing cocaine directly into the United States. In March 2006, for example, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
indicted 50 FARC leaders for drug trafficking and
claimed that FARC was supplying more than 50 percent of the world’s cocaine and more than 60 percent
of the cocaine that enters the United States. 48 In September 2006, two FARC members or associates, Cesar
Augusto Perez-Parra and Farouk Shaikh-Reyes, were
convicted of drug conspiracy. Reportedly, they were
planning to supply 1,000 to 2,000 kilos to Miami every
30 to 45 days.49 Tovar-Parra, a high-ranking member
of the 14th Front of FARC, which had become a key
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participant in the drug business, was also indicted.50
Significantly, there has also been some FARC presence
in West Africa where countries such as Guinea-Bissau
have become key transshipment countries for cocaine
being sent to the lucrative European market.51
Another insurgent movement that became heavily involved in drug trafficking—this time from Afghanistan through Central Asia—was the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Some commentators
even suggested that the group was more interested in
profit than politics and ultimately was little more than
a criminal organization using terrorist activities and
its annual military campaigns as devices to obscure
or protect its drug business.52 The assessment by the
Kyrgyz government that the IMU was responsible for
70 percent of the drugs moving through Central Asia
was widely cited, even though the evidence for this
assessment was unclear.
Svante Cornell presents a more subtle and persuasive analysis of the divide in the IMU between the
military, operational, and transportation wing of the
insurgency run by Juma Namangami, and the ideological or spiritual wing led by Tohir Yoldash, a picture of internal divisions not entirely dissimilar from
those that bedeviled the FARC.53 Moreover, many IMU
members fought in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban
and al-Qaeda. Their ranks were decimated, and Namangami was killed. This suggests that the IMU had at
least some commitment to identity politics and could
not be dismissed simply as a profit-oriented criminal
enterprise. The profit-making activities engaged in by
the IMU—which included kidnapping as well as drug
trafficking—seem to have been motivated, at least in
part, by the desire to fund the political-religious struggle rather than by an unadulterated desire for profit.
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Certainly Central Asian governments had a vested
interest in characterizing the movement as criminal
rather than recognizing it as one of the few channels
in the region for expressing legitimate dissent.
The linkage between insurgency and the drug
business is also relevant in Afghanistan. The opium
economy in Afghanistan, though, was well established
by the 1990s, and in 1993 Uzbek Customs seized 1.3
metric tons of pure heroin at a border crossing from
Afghanistan.54 Although the extent of Taliban involvement in the drug business was partially obscured by
the opium ban in 2000, it seems clear that, like the
FARC, it imposed taxes on those involved. In fact,
when the Taliban was in power, the tax on opium was
one of its few enduring sources of income. As the Taliban has sought to regain power, its involvement in the
drug business has expanded. This growing involvement was probably facilitated by the structure of the
resurgent Taliban as “a loose alliance in which each
region was responsible for raising its own funds.”55
If this is so, it accords at least partially with Naylor’s argument that “the danger of criminalization of
motive is particularly acute when individual militants
are allowed to run their own enterprises or rackets in
exchange for kicking back a certain sum to the group
as a whole.”56 By 2004, Taliban teams were attacking
checkpoints or making diversionary strikes to protect
opium cultivation; by 2007, major commanders were
reportedly running their own mobile laboratories to
process heroin.57 Press reports have also suggested
that some members of the Taliban have gone a step
further and traded heroin for weapons with Russian
criminal organizations.
This clearly reflects a dynamic similar to that exhibited by FARC. Indeed, it is possible to identify
what can be described as a stairway process whereby
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insurgents become progressively more involved in the
drug business—although it should be acknowledged
that prior steps are not prerequisites. Some insurgent groups and/or their supporters are likely to get
involved in the trafficking stage even if they are not
co-located with the cultivation and processing of narcotics. A good example is LTTE involvement in drug
trafficking. Starting in the early 1980s, Tamils began
trafficking in drugs in order to finance the political
struggle in Sri Lanka. Tamil traffickers were responsible for significant caches of heroin seized in Switzerland, leading Swiss authorities to focus on what they
dubbed the “Tamil connection.”58 The peak years for
arrests of Tamil drug traffickers were 1984 (317) and
1985 (374). In 1986 the number of arrests went down
to 218, and by 1990 it was only 37.59
Although there does not seem to have been a resurgence of Tamil drug trafficking in Europe since
then, the drug market in Sri Lanka itself continued
to expand, with some estimates suggesting that there
were over 100,000 users by the end of the 1990s. If we
accept that there is considerable flexibility rather than
a single uniform pattern for insurgencies co-located
with drug cultivation, the key steps are typically as
follows:
•	The assertion of territorial control over regions
in which botanical drugs are cultivated.
•	The protection of those who are involved in
cultivation against government interference
with their activities. In some cases, those involved in cultivation or processing move into
insurgent-controlled territory in order to obtain
protection against the state rather than the insurgents expanding to incorporate the growers
and processors.
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•	The imposition of fees or taxes for these protection activities.
•	Payments by traffickers who come to the region
to pick up the product in return for protection
against government interference.
• Protection of processing activities.
• Direct involvement in processing.
•	Supply to traffickers in other countries (sometimes for money, sometimes barter for guns).
•	Direct involvement in the trafficking business.
In this final step, the insurgents develop a fully
integrated criminal enterprise that extends into the
wholesale market in host states. Several observations
are worth emphasizing here. First, this final step might
not be an easy one to take. With FARC, it probably resulted from the coincidence of increasing involvement
in the drug business, with the destruction of the major
vertically integrated organizations in Medellin and
Cali that for so long dominated cocaine trafficking to
the United States and the subsequent flattening of the
Colombian supplier base. Second, this final step is attractive and alluring. As Naylor observed, “To collect
truly impressive sums, a guerilla group would have to
become directly involved at least with the export traffic in finished product, and it would be best if it could
participate in the actual marketing of the refined material inside countries of final destination.”60 Whether
the Taliban has either the inclination or the capacity to
do something similar is not clear.
Yet, there is an additional factor here. Just as the
name of the game in Colombia was cocaine, in Afghanistan, it is opium and heroin. And it is not only
insurgents who are involved. When the state, for whatever reason, is weak and there is a dominant commod-
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ity—or what some writers have termed a lootable resource—much of the crime, violence, and corruption
in the state centers on that commodity. This seems to
hold true whether it is opium and heroin in Afghanistan, cocaine in Colombia, diamonds in Sierra Leone,
or oil in Iraq.
Moreover, at least three different kinds of players
are often linked in a complex matrix of intersecting
and overlapping networks: criminals interested in
profit; insurgents seeking funding for their political/
ideological cause; and corrupt officials and other players within the government who use their position to
obtain rents.61 Sometimes these three distinct groups
compete with one another; at other times they either
develop specific forms of cooperation or engage in
tacit agreement not to interfere with each other’s activities. In Afghanistan, for example, members of the
Karzai government, including the President’s halfbrother, have been deeply implicated in one way or
another with the drug trade. Indeed, any notion that
only the Taliban is involved in the opium business
and that a monolithic unified government is trying
to suppress this business is a distortion of reality. In
Afghanistan, opium is common currency, a source of
power and influence, a driver of symbiotic relationships, and a place where corrupt government officials,
tribal networks, Taliban insurgents, and transnational
drug trafficking organizations overlap and intersect.
Corrupt officials at all levels help to facilitate the business.
A similarly pervasive culture of corruption developed in Iraq after the 2003 invasion. For the Iraqi
insurgency and for corrupt officials, the equivalent of
the opium resource in Afghanistan was oil and petroleum products. The theft, diversion, smuggling, and
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black market sales of oils became a source of funding
for a variety of groups involved in violent conflict.
There were at least three different dimensions to this.62
1. The theft and diversion of crude oil and its smuggling from the Al Basra Oil Terminal or through the
Shat-al-Arab Waterway to the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) and as far away as India. Some of this smuggling was done through a process of oil bunkering
similar to that in the Niger Delta in which small vessels transferred their loads to oil tankers at sea. Both
tribes and corrupt officials were involved. This tended
to be a Shia-dominated activity, simply because there
were relatively few Sunnis in Basra. There was also
considerable competition among the Shia parties and
militias for the “rents” which could be obtained, and
this often spilled over into violence. Jaish-al-Mahdi,
which at times tacitly allied with Sunni insurgents in
attacks on Coalition forces yet also engaged in sectarian cleansing of Sunnis (especially in Baghdad),
became a key player in providing protection for oil
smuggling as did the Fadhila Party.63
2. Sunni insurgents also became involved in looting the oil resource, diverting refined products from
the country’s most important refinery at Bayji and
hijacking oil trucks at multiple points along Iraq’s insecure highways. They were helped by officials at the
refinery and by officials in the Ministry of Oil.64
3. Diversion of oil and petroleum products in transit is the third dimension of oil looting. This was facilitated by a system in which there was no coordinated
supervision—let alone centralized control—over legitimate transactions and shipments of oil and petroleum from one part of Iraq to another. The attractiveness of diversions was even greater because Iraq had
to import refined products to meet demand. These
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imported fuels were then sold to Iraqi gas stations at
prices subsidized by the government. The fuels could
also be stolen and sold on the black market or could
be re-exported to Iraq’s neighbors where prices were
higher.65
In sum, where resources can be stolen, diverted,
and smuggled, insurgents can take control of the commodity and develop major illicit revenue streams. Indeed, when the product is something like diamonds
or oil, the steps are fewer than in the illicit drug industry, and insurgent control over the business can
sometimes be established more rapidly.
Insurgent criminal activity, of course, is not always
confined to the territory under its control. In some instances, the insurgency has considerable international
support. The LTTE, for example, has benefited enormously from the Tamil diaspora. Some of this took
the form of donations that came simply from political
sympathy for the cause; sometimes, however, “donations” were obtained through extortion. According to
some reports in the mid-1990s, the LTTE had cells in
as many as 38 countries in Europe, the Middle East,
and North America.66 These cells obtained financial
support from the Tamil communities through voluntary contributions or intimidation and extortion.
Reports in various countries including Canada reveal
that LTTE supporters have engaged in extensive credit card fraud, social security fraud, counterfeiting, and
extortion. In the late 1990s, the LTTE also diversified
into alien smuggling and human trafficking. According to the Sri Lankan government, the Tamil Tigers
used two shipping companies in an alien smuggling
business that in 1999 alone moved 17,000 people to 11
countries.67 Reportedly, this business earned $340 mil-
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lion. The government’s assessment concluded that the
operation was “one of the LTTE’s major fund raising
devices for its ongoing war with Sri Lankan government troops.”68
The defeat of the LTTE, of course, revealed that
even with multiple revenue streams, an insurgency
can lose. Nevertheless, crime has become an essential
source of funding and generally makes insurgencies
more sustainable and more difficult for governments
to defeat. When insurgents become involved in criminal activities, they are also more likely to become involved in some kind of cooperative relationship with
criminal organizations concerned only about profit.
As Thomas Naylor has acknowledged, “Any insurgency using the international black market to finance
its activities inevitably forms mutually profitable and
likely quite durable relations with international criminal groups.”69 The nature and scope of these relationships can now be examined.
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INSURGENTS AND
CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES
Assessing insurgency-criminal cooperation is similar in many respects to analyzing cooperation between
criminal organizations and terrorist groups—or what
is sometimes rather glibly termed the “organized
crime-terrorism nexus.” There are several different
views on this. One important strand of thinking is that
criminal organizations and terrorist groups are very
different kinds of entities, driven by different objectives and different attitudes towards government, and
operating in ways which make them anything but
natural allies. As a leading Dutch criminologist and
his co-author noted:
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to real career criminals, the conduct of politically motivated terrorists appears incomprehensible if not downright “weird.” Why would anyone take such extreme
risks without any prospect of getting rich in the end?
Who would want to openly confront the authorities
instead of evading or corrupting them? Is it not much
more sensible to keep illegal activities as low-key and
hidden as possible? Is it not foolish to draw attention
to yourself by using disproportional violence? The opportunities for organized crime are largely based on
the idea of exploiting the existing imperfections in the
economic and moral system of the state. . . . Viewed
from this perspective, organized crime is conservative.
Solving social and political problems would put it out
of business.70

On the other side, Tamara Makarenko complained
that the linkages are underestimated, noting that there
is a:
common reticence within the academic community to
consider arguments which go contrary to the widely
accepted view that criminal and terrorist groups have
no interest in cooperating because any interaction is
faced with inherent risks associated with trust, loyalty, divergent views on the necessity of the state, and
transaction costs which naturally increases vulnerability of both sides to the authorities.71

The issue is not so much whether or not there are
cooperative linkages— obviously there are some—but
under what conditions and to what extent criminals
and insurgents are likely to cooperate with one another.
In terms of conditions, one possibility is cooperation in the early stages of insurgency. Criminals and
insurgents often come out of the same social milieu,
know each other, and might even trust one another.
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In some cases in Southeast Asia and India, insurgent
groups have even used existing organized crime structures as “building blocks exploiting both existing ‘bandit’ groups and smuggling routes and infrastructures
as support systems for their movements.”72 Family or
clan relationships facilitate this kind of co-option.73
Closely linked to this, cooperation also takes place
when insurgent organizations and criminal enterprises have a natural affinity for one another. In Chechnya,
for example, criminal enterprises and Chechen rebels
during the 1990s shared a hatred of Russia. With both
grounded in what Shultz and Dew termed “the unifying forces of tribalism and nationalism,”74 cooperation
was both easy and natural whenever insurgent interests and criminal interests coincided. The relationship
between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Albanian criminals was equally close. In fact, it was not
simply a matter of commonality of interests between
the KLA and Albanian criminal organizations. Rather,
it was a matter of blurred identities and overlapping
and perhaps even common membership. As Xavier
Raufer has argued, there was:
no way to distinguish Albanian guerrillas from local
mafia groups. They have the same mindset and share
the same goals. There’s not such a thing as rebels and
militias on the one hand and the Albanian mafia on
the other. In the Albanian world . . . you have clans . . .
and in those clans you have a mix of young men fighting for the cause of national liberation, young men belonging to the mafia, young men driving their cousins
or other girls from the village into prostitution. It’s
absolutely impossible to distinguish between them.
They obey the same clans, they have the same logic,
the same world view, and to discriminate between one
guy who is one day selling heroin and the next day
fighting in the mountains is absolutely impossible.75
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Insurgent groups and criminal organizations also
tend to cooperate, sometimes explicitly and sometimes tacitly, where they are co-located and share an
interest in limiting the power and reach of government
forces. Co-location can be understood in two overlapping ways—geographical (i.e., territorial) space and
opportunity space. Iraq provided some very interesting examples of such cooperation, especially in the
kidnapping business, with “many credible reports
suggesting that hostages, in particular foreign nationals, taken by criminal gangs” were subsequently
“handed over to armed political groups in exchange
for money.”76 With kidnapping gangs and insurgent
and jihadi groups operating in the same space, some
kind of relationship was inevitable. The relationship
could have been one of rivalry and competition, but
seems instead to have been one of tacit and explicit
cooperation. Sometimes the initiative was taken by
the kidnapping gangs, which would abduct people in
the expectation that they could sell them to the political groups that might either kill or ransom them. So
long as the kidnapping gangs were paid, the fate of
the hostages was irrelevant.
On other occasions, however, the insurgency and
jihadi groups let it be known that they had certain
requirements or targets; the for-profit kidnapping
group typically responded to what was, in effect, a
request for services by abducting the appropriate
kind of victim. “As the kidnap industry . . . matured,
investigators saw cooperation evolve among criminal groups, and between them and the insurgency.
Victims are sometimes sold and resold, gaining value each time.”77 In other words, the criminal market
worked very efficiently and successfully, fully cor-

54

roborating John Robb’s conclusion that it operated as
a bazaar of violence.78 Something very similar seems
to have occurred in Afghanistan where, as Matthieu
Aikins has noted, the burgeoning kidnapping industry has become a key part of the conflict economy.79
As in Iraq, foreigners are the most lucrative target for
kidnapping, but not the most frequent targets.
In some respects, kidnapping in Iraq and Afghanistan is simply one example of the kind of cooperation that can occur when insurgencies become heavily engaged in criminal markets as either suppliers
or customers of the criminal organizations. Indeed,
it is when insurgencies engage in do-it-yourself organized crime that they are most likely to cooperate
with criminal organizations. As noted above, when
FARC became involved in processing cocaine, it was
only a small step to supplying the drugs to trafficking
organizations. Similarly in Afghanistan, as the Taliban
has become more involved in the opium and heroin
trade, it has established closer ties with drug trafficking organizations ranging from those operating out of
Quetta in Pakistan to Russian and Tajik criminal organizations which traffic the heroin into the states of the
former Soviet Union.
How these relationships are to be accurately characterized is a critical issue. They probably range from
market suppliers and customers, to tactical alliances
and perhaps even to strategic alliances. Market transactions, of course, can take the form not only of goods
but also of services. As insurgents become more involved in criminal activities, their need for facilitated
travel and transportation increases, and they will
sometimes turn to what have been termed “criminal
service providers” for the provision of items such as
false documentation and forged passports.80
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In some cases, cooperation is little more than an
ad hoc response to convergent need on the one side
and opportunity on the other, not progressing beyond
a single transaction. In other cases, though, transactions might be regularized and routine, resulting in
the development of trust and even the emergence of a
tactical alliance to carry out certain kinds of mutually
beneficial activities. In a few cases, the cooperation
will become so extensive and the relationship so profitable and enduring that it is legitimate to refer to it
as a strategic alliance. Although Naylor is skeptical of
claims that there are strategic alliances between insurgents and criminal organizations, in some cases criminal enterprises and insurgencies not only engage in
systematic and extensive cooperation but also expect
to continue doing so in the future. Such strategic alliances transcend the vagaries of the market and generally involve either high levels of trust or sufficiently
profitable cooperative ventures that both parties are
fully committed to their continuation and even their
deepening.
Most of these relationships have a degree of mutuality with benefits accruing to both parties. In some instances, however, there might be one-sided exploitation without any explicit or even tacit cooperation and
perhaps no awareness by one of the parties that it is
going on. Exploitation by criminals of insurgent-held
territory for trafficking, for example, offers a natural
protection from interdiction by government forces.
In Sri Lanka, traffickers of illicit commodities such
as drugs brought these commodities into the country
through LTTE-held territory.81 It is not clear that the
LTTE was always aware of this and able to impose
regular taxes on the goods and their transportation. It
might well have been inadvertent and even unwitting
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facilitation by the LTTE. If insurgent groups are aware
of such activities and impose a tax on those operating
in the geographical areas under their control but offer nothing in return, then the relationship is simply
one of predator and victim. A step up from this is a
symbiotic or mutually beneficial relationship in which
the payment of protection taxes is reciprocated by real
protection against the forces of the state or even more
overt facilitation of some kind.
One way of seeing these cooperative relationships
is in terms of enhancing social capital. In this connection, Ronald Burt has identified a tradeoff that faces
all organizations, both licit and illicit, between what
he terms closure and brokerage.82 On the one hand,
organizations need closure for cohesion and trust; on
the other they need brokerage for openness, vision,
and access to additional resources. Both insurgent and
criminal organizations have to be concerned about security and consequently form relatively closed groups,
which seek to instill loyalty. By reaching out to one
another, however, they can both obtain assets which
would otherwise be unavailable.
Yet, there are also likely to be different positions
and preferences regarding both the wisdom and the
benefits of cooperating with different kinds of organizations. As suggested above, pragmatic criminals
and political or ideological militants are not natural
bedfellows, and working together is unlikely to be
endorsed by all. Unfortunately, little is known about
the internal deliberations of either insurgent groups
or criminal enterprises regarding cooperation. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a range of positions
on cooperation: some within insurgencies will want to
avoid it; others will adopt a more pragmatic approach,
advocating cooperation when the benefits outweigh
risks and it can be done without attracting much at57

tention; while yet others will see it as a natural synergy—especially if the groups, in spite of divergent
objectives, came out of the same environment. Those
who object are likely to do so because of concerns that
the link with criminals might taint the movement and
reduce its political appeal. These concerns are not
without merit.
The Slippery Slope of Criminality.
Insurgents engaged in criminal activities or cooperation with criminals to fund their programs of
political violence and their ideological objectives face
several dangers, including the loss of cohesion. Money can be a divisive as well as unifying force within an
insurgency. Indeed, divisions can arise over the distribution of money as well as its source. While distribution issues can become highly contentious, arguments
over the source of funds are often more fundamental
as they center on the very nature of the insurgency; an
even more serious problem than the loss of cohesion
is the loss of political identity. Generally, insurgents
are fighting for a cause that is related to the removal
of the existing government and its replacement with a
form of government based on different norms, values,
and principles. In most cases, insurgents seek to establish the dominance of distinctive ideas of social justice and the redistribution of resources within society
in accordance with those principles. With left-wing
insurgents, the struggle is to replace what is seen as
elite dominance and exploitation with social egalitarianism. In the case of insurgency inspired by religion,
the aim is usually to replace secular government with
a government based on religious fundamentalism or
one kind of sectarian dominance with another kind.
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These objectives are not easily reconciled with
the widespread use of criminal activities, and even
though criminal activities are typically justified in
some ways (for example, Islamic insurgents typically
condemn drug consumption but accept drug trafficking on the grounds that the infidel is both customer
and target), such justifications can all too easily smack
of hypocrisy. Moreover, as Naylor has argued, “The
lure of quick wealth can on occasion cause a guerilla
organization . . . to degenerate into simple criminality.”83 The acquisition of funds as a means to an end
can become an end in itself. The result is distraction
from the cause.
In extreme cases, this leads to a transformation
from insurgent group to criminal enterprise, the cause
be damned. The Pentagon Gang in the Philippines
is a case in point. Made up of former Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) rebels, The Pentagon Gang has become
predominantly a criminal organization that has made
considerable money through kidnapping for ransom.
Although some observers claim that the Pentagon
Gang is the fund-raising arm of the MILF, the MILF
has denied this and in July 2009 actually apprehended
a Pentagon Gang member responsible for kidnapping
a 4-year-old Chinese boy.84 Another example is FARC.
One indication of the transformation was the opulence
of some of FARC’s jungle locations, which suggested
that the organization had become less ideological and
more mercenary. Indeed, some observers now believe
that FARC has both transformed and fragmented from
a cohesive insurgency united by ideological beliefs and
aspirations, to a set of drug trafficking organizations
animated by nothing other than the desire for profit.
In effect, those who were concerned that FARC’s in-
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volvement in the drug business would compromise
its ideological purity were proved correct. This was
not unprecedented. Some years earlier, the Burmese
Communist Party had also succumbed to what Naylor described as “the corrupting influence of narcotics
money.”85
Closely related to the loss of the insurgency’s identity (which is essentially internal) is the loss of its legitimacy in the wider community. Insurgents fight for
what they typically see as loftily unselfish goals: they
are using violence on behalf of principles or ideological mandates. From this perspective, the use of criminal activity for funding is a two-edged sword. It can
enhance the sustainability of the organization but can
also diminish the level of its support. A good example
of this occurred in Iraq where Jaish-al-Mahdi (a militia which was at times involved in the insurgency
but also became the protector of large segments of the
Shia population in Baghdad) became so predatory in
its criminal activities that many of its erstwhile supporters and constituents became disillusioned. In response, JAM sought to reestablish its legitimacy with
a large part of the Shia population by purging the
most egregious criminals from its ranks.
Criminal behavior has also become a problem for
the Taliban in Afghanistan, with one analyis claiming
that banditry, extortion, bribery, and all-out criminality “have undermined Taliban tactics and strategy”
and corrupted “the organization from the district
level on up, likely infecting provincial level leadership as well.”86 Fortunately for the Taliban, however,
government corruption is widely seen as even more
pervasive, disruptive, and exploitative. Consequently,
the Taliban has not had the same kind of legitimacy
crisis that confronted JAM in Iraq.
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In some cases, the reliance on criminal activities
offers opportunities for governments either to drive
wedges or make deals, with the result that the insurgents give up their campaigns of violence in return for
being able continue with their criminal enterprises.
Ironically, the more important criminal activities become, the greater the prospects for deal-making—
as highlighted by Richard Snyder in his analysis
of lootable resources.87 Snyder notes that although
lootable resources sometimes contribute to disorder, they can also contribute to order. As he notes,
in Burma during the 1990s “a major expansion of the
narcotics industry” was accompanied not by growing
violence, but by “the ending of civil war, demobilization of insurgents, and the successful restoration of a
military regime’s grip on power.”88 In his view, “the
opium boom contributed to the emergence of political order in the 1990s because (a) opium provided a
lucrative ‘exit option’ for rebels, making it easier for
the military to demobilize them; and (b) the military
built institutions of joint extraction with the erstwhile
rebels that gave it a large share of opium revenues.”89
A tacit social contract in which insurgent groups were
allowed to continue their drug trafficking activities in
return for the cessation of violence was subsequently
extended to allow drug proceeds to be invested in the
economy. Consequently, former insurgent drug lords
such as Lo Hsing Han and Khun Sa became major entrepreneurs investing in hotels, casinos, and various
other businesses.90
The other danger for an insurgency is that if tensions arise about the distribution of the spoils of criminal activity among various factions, this provides opportunities for wedge-driving. This is particularly the
case in a composite insurgency. Control over smug-
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gling activities, for example, became a major point of
contention in the Iraq insurgency as al-Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI) sought to take over control of the traditional
smuggling and black market activities of the Sunni
tribes and to appropriate most of the proceeds from
these activities. These tensions between AQI and
the tribes created major opportunities for the United
States. The result was the Anbar Awakening and the
defeat of AQI in the province.91 Another facet of this
dispute was that the insurgency had become a source
of employment. By creating and paying for the Sons of
Iraq, which for most intents and purposes was a Sunni
militia, the United States, in effect, outbid AQI. Even
so, AQI continued to use criminal activities such as car
theft, kidnapping, and extortion to maintain its resistance in and around Mosul and several other places.
The implication of the preceding analysis is that insurgents’ resort to criminal activities for funding and
the development of linkages with criminal enterprises
can be a double-edged sword, both perpetuating and
weakening insurgency at the same time. The tensions
created by criminal activity are sometimes even reflected in the aftermath of insurgency. Naylor notes,
for example, that “after the end of the Huk rebellion in
the Philippines in 1950 . . . some elements took to the
hills to engage in social banditry, redistributing stolen wealth among poor peasants, while others settled
down near U.S. military bases to collect rake-offs from
the gambling and prostitution rackets. . . .”92 In effect,
some of the insurgents remained true to their ideals
while others found that the fund-raising skills they
had developed during the insurgency could be put to
good use for personal enrichment after the conflict.
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FINAL REFLECTIONS
Throughout this chapter, an attempt has been
made to offer analytic clarity through a set of carefully
drawn terminology and conceptual distinctions as related to insurgencies and organized crime. A difficulty
is, of course, that the analysis tends to categorize and
conceptualize the actors and the issues in a manner
that may strike as overly neat and indifferent to difficult loose ends. For example, in this KLA scenario,
insurgents and criminals, in part at least, are labels
imposed from outside and are not necessarily synonymous with the ways in which members of insurgencies or criminal organizations see themselves.93 The
emphasis here has been on distinctions and conceptual constructs. Yet terrorists, insurgents, and criminals
are not bound by these distinctions and differentiations. Instead, they have their own reality, their own
imperatives, and their own logic, all of which are internally driven rather than externally imposed. There
is clearly an important distinction between activities
which are oriented towards profits and those which
are political—and in some cases engaging in the former will erode and compromise the latter. Yet, there
are also actors who manage to engage in both activities and see no tension between them. Being a greedy
criminal is not necessarily incompatible with being a
committed terrorist or insurgent.
If this idea is accepted, then it is necessary to consider not only the relationships outlined above—relationships between different kinds of entities and between entities and activities—but also the possibility
that new kinds of hybrid organizations have emerged,
are emerging, or will emerge in the future. Some of
these hybrid organizations have a dual agenda, si-
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multaneously pursuing both political and financial
objectives and seemingly managing both pursuits
successfully. In effect, both motives and methods
are mixed in ways that do not fit the traditional and
existing categories. Some commentators are groping
towards analysis of these hybrids. Justine Rosenthal,
for example, has used the term “for-profit terrorism,”
which initially seems an oxymoron but actually captures what could well be an emerging reality.94 Indeed,
Daewood Ibrahim, leader of D-company, seems to be
both a very successful criminal entrepreneur and, on
some occasions at least, a terrorist and/or terrorist
facilitator.95 Similarly, the notion of warlords seems
to involve dual objectives. In both Africa and Southeast Asia, some groups seem to have transformed
over time from ideological insurgency to warlords
whose underlings are there for a job, not a cause. As
Lawrence Cline put it, their violence and brutality do
not accord with what he terms the “cleaner models”
of criminal organizations.96 Yet such groups need to
be accounted for. Groups like the Lord’s Resistance
Army in Uganda seem to have little reason for continued existence aside from looting and the opportunity to make survival money, and seem to be located
somewhere between insurgents, criminal organizations, and anomic violence.97 Whatever the case, they
seem unlikely to disappear anytime soon. Similarly,
some hybrids—and Abu Sayyaf might fit here—seem
to be in an interim stage of metamorphosis. Yet it is
not inevitable that what appears to be a transformation from one type of organization to another will actually be completed. The problem for analysts is that
what currently appears to be an interim stage between
groups with clear identities and objectives might well
prove to be as enduring as it is uncomfortable.
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